

1 Michael H. Kim, Esq. (State Bar No. 200792)

2 **MICHAEL H. KIM, P.C.**

3 1633 Bayshore Highway, Suite 333

4 Burlingame, California 94010

5 Telephone: (650) 697-8899

6 Facsimile: (650) 697-8896

7 Attorneys for Plaintiffs

8 FERNANDO GUTIERREZ; DAVID

9 CASTILLO; MARCO GONZALEZ,

10 individually and on behalf of others similarly
11 situated

12 **SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

13 **FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO**

14 FERNANDO GUTIERREZ; DAVID
15 CASTILLO; MARCO GONZALEZ,
16 individually and on behalf of others similarly
17 situated,

18 Plaintiffs,

19 vs.

20 SAARMAN CONSTRUCTION, LTD.;
21 SAARMAN, LLC; and DOES 1 through
22 100, inclusive.

23 Defendants.

Case No. CGC-18-568258

**MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF
CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT**

Date: April 7, 2023

Time: 10:00 a.m.

Dept.: 613

Judge: The Hon. Andrew Y.S. Cheng

Action Filed: July 20, 2018

ELECTRONICALLY

FILED

Superior Court of California,
County of San Francisco

02/24/2023

Clerk of the Court

BY: JUDITH NUNEZ

Deputy Clerk

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Table of Contents

I. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION..... 1

 A. Background And Claims..... 1

 1. Failure to Pay Prevailing Wages at Francis of Assisi (Mercy Housing Project)..... 2

 2. Failure to Pay Overtime Wages Employees Under Its Alternative Workweek Schedule Whereby The Employees Worked 8.5 hours from Monday through Thursday and 6 hours on Fridays 2

 3. Failure to Pay For Travel Expenses To And From The Job Sites 4

 4. Defendant’s Defenses 4

 B. Discovery and Mediation..... 4

II. PROPOSED SETTLEMENT..... 6

 A. Settlement Class..... 6

 B. Settlement Consideration 6

 C. Release by Class Members 7

 D. Notice Procedure..... 8

III. LEGAL ARGUMENT 9

 A. The Settlement Agreement Resulted from Arm's-Length Negotiations..... 9

 B. Preliminary Approval of the Settlement is Warranted..... 9

 1. The Strength of Plaintiffs’ Case..... 10

 2. The Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Duration of Further Litigation 10

 3. The Risk of Maintaining Class Action Status..... 11

 4. The Amount Offered in Settlement..... 11

 5. Summary of *Kullar* Analysis 17

 6. The Extent of Discovery Completed and the Stage of the Proceedings 18

 7. The Experience and Views of Counsel..... 18

 8. The Settlement Has No “Obvious Deficiencies” and Falls Well Within the Range for Approval..... 19

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

C. The Court Should Approve the Proposed Notice of Class Action..... 19

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

<u>Cases</u>	<u>Page</u>
<i>Air Lines Stewards v. American Airlines, Inc.</i> (7th Cir. 1972) 455 F.2d 101	11
<i>Behrens v. Wometco Enters., Inc.</i> (S.D. Fla. 1988) 118 F.R.D. 534	11, 12
<i>Cartt v. Superior Court</i> (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960	19
<i>Cellphone Term. Fee Cases</i> (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1380	19
<i>Cellphone Termination Fee Cases</i> (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1110	10
<i>Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.</i> (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794	10
<i>Dunleavy v. Nadler</i> (9th Cir. 2000) 213 F.3d 454	17, 19
<i>Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline</i> (1974) 417 U.S. 156	20
<i>Ellis v. Naval Air Rework Facility</i> (N.D. Cal. 1980) 87 F.R.D. 15	18
<i>Glass v. UBS Financial Servs.</i> (C.D.Cal. 2007) 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8476	12, 17
<i>In re Excess Value Ins. Coverage Litig.</i> (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2004) 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14822	9
<i>In re Trombley</i> (1948) 31 Cal.2d 801	17
<i>Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.</i> (2008) 18 Cal.App.4th 116	11, 18, 19
<i>Linney v. Cellular Alaska Partnership</i> (9th Cir. 1998) 151 F.3d 1234	17
<i>National Rural Telecomm. Coop. v. DirecTV, Inc.</i> (C.D. Cal. 2004) 221 F.R.D. 523	19
<i>Nordstrom Comm'n Cases</i> (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 576	10
<i>Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n</i> (9th Cir. 1982) 688 F.2d 615	10
<i>Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.</i> (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224	11, 19
<i>Williams v. Vukovich</i> (6th Cir.1983) 720 F.2d 909	9

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Statutes and Regulations

8 Cal. Reg. Code § 13520	17
California Rules of Court, Rule 3.766	19
California Rules of Court, Rule 3.769	9, 19
Civil Code § 1542	20
Code of Civil Procedure § 340	16
IWC Wage Order No. 16-2001, § 8(B)	14
Labor Code § 203	17
Labor Code § 226	15
Labor Code § 2802	14, 15

Secondary Sources:

4 Alba Conte & Herbert B. Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions § 11.25 (4th ed. 2002)	9
Manual For Complex Litig. (4th Ed. 2004), §21.612	9

1 **I.SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION**

2 **A. Background And Claims**

3 On July 20, 2018, Plaintiffs filed the instant wage and hour class action against Saarman
4 Construction, Ltd., and Saarman, LLC for: (1) Failure to Pay Wages including State minimum and
5 prevailing wages; (2) Failure to Pay Overtime Wages; (3) Failure to Furnish Accurate Wage
6 Statements; (4) Failure to Indemnify for Work Expenses; and (5) Unfair Competition in Violation
7 of Business & Professions Code Section 17200. The class action lawsuit has been brought on
8 behalf of all hourly construction workers, laborers, and carpenters who worked for Defendants in
9 California during the period of four years prior to the filing of this action through the present.
10 Saarman, LLC was subsequently dismissed from the action without prejudice, and the pending class
11 action is currently proceeding only as to Saarman Construction, Ltd. (“Defendant” or “Saarman
12 Construction”).

13 Saarman Construction is a licensed construction contractor that provides reconstruction,
14 restoration, and seismic retrofitting services for existing and occupied properties in California and
15 Hawaii. According Saarman Construction, Ltd., “[f]rom north of the delta to south of San Jose, we
16 work on a broad array of construction projects throughout Northern California and Hawaii.
17 Specializing in occupied space we provide general contracting services to homeowners
18 associations, apartments, commercial and hospitality buildings as well as single-family homes.”

19 On July 1, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint to add a Sixth Cause of Action
20 for Failure to Pay Earned Wages Upon Termination or Discharge.

21 This wage and hour lawsuit concerns three main issues. The first issue concerns Defendant’s
22 failure to pay the proper prevailing wages to its carpenters at a public works project known as
23 Francis of Assisi, a/k/a the Mercy Housing Project, located at 145 Guerrero Street, San Francisco,
24 CA, 94103. The second issue concerns Defendant’s Alternative Workweek Schedule (“AWS”)
25 whereby Plaintiffs and Class Members worked 8.5 hours Monday through Thursday and 6 hours on
26 Friday every workweek without the payment of overtime wages for all hours worked in excess of 8
27 hours in a workday. The third issue concerns Defendant’s failure to reimburse Plaintiffs and Class
28

1 Members for their travel time to and from their jobsites when they drove their vehicles to bring
2 their personal work tools.

3 **1. Failure to Pay Prevailing Wages at Francis of Assisi (Mercy Housing Project)**

4 Francis of Assisi, also known as the Mercy Housing Project, was a public works project
5 located at 145 Guerrero Street, San Francisco, 94103. As a public works project, it was subject to
6 California prevailing wage laws. Saarman Construction was contracted to perform renovation work
7 relating to inside and outside walls, cabinetry, windows, and roofs at this project from September of
8 2016 through September of 2018.

9 On this project, Saarman Construction employed carpenters and laborers (including their
10 superintendents and foremen). These workers primarily performed job duties that are assigned to
11 certified carpenters: waterproofing around window installations, waterproofing around sliding door
12 installations, creating holes in the roof to anchor and mount solar panels and then waterproofing the
13 holes and bolts, hanging sheetrock for inside walls (attaching sheetrock to interior metal frames
14 using screws), hanging DenseGlass (a type of fiberglass exterior gypsum sheathing used for exterior
15 walls) for outside walls, building interior walls with metal studs, and building metal framing made
16 of metal studs to divide the rooms inside.

17 Based on their actual job duties and the nature of the work done at the Mercy Housing
18 Project, their work hours should have been paid at the carpenter's prevailing wage rates. However,
19 Saarman Construction implemented a payroll policy or practice of reclassifying 3 or more hours of
20 their daily work hours each day as laborer's work. More specifically, on each shift each day,
21 Saarman Construction reclassified a portion of their daily hours worked as Laborer Group 3 so that
22 those reclassified hours are paid at the lower laborer's prevailing wage rate. According to Saarman
23 Construction, a total of 8006.5 hours of their time (excluding any hours attributable to those
24 workers who have settled and signed releases with Defendant) were reclassified as "Laborer Group
25 3" which allowed them to pay these hours at the lower "Laborer Group 3" prevailing wage rate.

26 **2. Failure to Pay Overtime Wages Employees Under Its Alternative Workweek**
27 **Schedule Whereby The Employees Worked 8.5 hours from Monday through**
28

1 **3. Failure to Pay For Travel Expenses To And From The Job Sites**

2 Saarman Construction’s employes brought and use their own personal tools at their job sites.
3 According to Plaintiffs, they were required to bring and use their own personal tools at Saarman
4 Construction’s work sites. While Defendant did provide large tools and equipment, they were
5 required to bring their own smaller personal tools such as tape measures, utility knives, nail pullers,
6 squares, drills, work belts, saws, sanders, jigsaws, multitools, and levels, which were not provided
7 by Defendant and were essential and necessary to perform their work at Defendant’s projects.

8 In addition, they had to drive their own vehicles to and from these work sites, bringing and
9 transporting their personal tools with them. Despite this fact, they were not reimbursed for their
10 miles or any travel expenses.

11 **4. Defendant’s Defenses**

12 Defendant denies any wrongdoing and denies liability and contends that it has valid
13 defenses to all of Plaintiffs’ claims. More specifically, Defendant contends that there is a valid
14 Alternative Workweek Schedule for all workers after 12/18/2012, that the statute and wage order
15 concerning AWS does require a separate AWS election for each work site, that no statutory
16 interpretation would require a contractor to hold a separate AWS election for each and every job
17 site, that California law expressly permits payment of different wage rates to the same worker on
18 any prevailing wage project, according to the character of the work actually performed, that
19 accurate time records were maintained to track the different characters of the work performed by its
20 employees at the Mercy Housing Project, and that California law allows an employer to require
21 workers to furnish “hand tools and equipment” if such tools and equipment are “customarily
22 required by the trade or craft.” IWC Wage Order 16, section 8(B). Defendant maintains that the
23 employer is not obligated to reimburse employees for use of these personal tools.

24 **B. Discovery and Mediation**

25 The Parties engaged extensively in both formal and informal discovery prior to resolving
26 this Action, conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of this Action, including written
27 discovery, extensive records production, and extensive meet and confer over Defendant’s
28

1 responses. The information obtained by Plaintiffs included: (1) over 6000 pages of payroll records,
2 time records, personnel files, Public Works Certified Payroll Reporting Form, U.S. Department of
3 Labor Payroll relating to the Mercy Housing Project, (2) plaintiff's payroll and time records and
4 personnel files; (3) Saarman Construction's Alternative Workweek Proposal and Disclosure, AWS
5 Informational Packet Sign-Off, AWS Informational Meeting Sign-In, AWS Voting Results, Labor
6 Code section 511(e) Notice to the Division of Labor Statistics and Research, Notice of
7 Implementation of AWS, compensation agreements for nearly all non-exempt employees in the
8 Class and specific pay plan scales in effect during the Class Period; (4) project locations; (5) AWS
9 data, including the number of workers who worked on AWS projects, the total number of shifts
10 worked on AWS, the total number of shifts longer than 8.0 hours on AWS projects, and the
11 estimated average hourly wages for workers working on AWS projects, (6) payroll and time data
12 relating to the Mercy Housing Project, including the number of shifts worked including hours, and
13 the total hours classified as "Laborer Group 3."

14 With this information, the Parties participated in 3 separate ADR sessions, which included 1
15 mediation and 2 mandatory settlement conferences. On May 26, 2022, the Parties participated in a
16 mediation presided over by the Honorable George Hernandez (Ret.) Dickstein, Esq., a respected
17 mediator of wage and hour class actions. The Parties vigorously debated their positions, the
18 likelihood of class certification, and the legal bases for their claims and defenses. Thereafter, on
19 June 27, 2022, the Parties attended a mandatory settlement conference with the Honorable Anne-
20 Christine Massullo. Again, the Parties vigorously debated their positions, the likelihood of class
21 certification, and the legal bases for their claims and defenses. On September 30, 2022, the Parties
22 participated in a second mandatory settlement conference with Judge Massullo, which ultimately
23 resulted in this class action settlement. This settlement is now being presented to this Court for
24 preliminary approval. The Parties agreed to settle the Action to resolve all claims alleged against
25 Defendant in Plaintiffs' operative complaint to the fullest extent permitted by law without any
26 admission of liability or wrongdoing by Defendants.

▪ Minus Court-approved Service Awards	\$15,000
▪ <u>Minus Settlement Administrator's costs (max)</u>	<u>\$11,000</u>
○ Net Settlement Amount	\$74,000

Thus, the Net Settlement Amount is estimated at \$74,000. This Net Settlement Amount is further allocated between the Class and the Mercy Housing Project Subclass as follows: 75% of the NSA to the Class and 25% of the NSA to the Subclass.

Each participating Class Members' share of the Net Settlement Amount will be calculated by using the following formulae. The portion of the Net Settlement Amount allocated to the Class shall be divided by the total number of shifts over 8.0 hours that all Class Members worked during the Class Period under the Alternative Workweek Schedule, but were not paid an overtime premium rate for time in excess of 8.0 hours. This will result in the "Shift Value." Each Class Member's Individual Settlement Payment will be calculated by multiplying the Shift Value by the number of shifts over 8.0 hours that the Class Member worked during the Class Period under the Alternative Workweek Schedule, but were not paid an overtime premium rate for time in excess of 8.0 hours.

The portion of the Net Settlement amount allocated to the Mercy Housing Project Subclass shall be divided by the total number of hours worked by all Mercy Housing Project Subclass Members on the Mercy Housing Project that were allocated to "Laborer Group 3," resulting in the "Hour Value." Each Mercy Housing Project Subclass Member's Individual Settlement Payment will be calculated by multiplying the number of hours the individual worked that were allocated to "Laborer Group 3" by the "Hour Value."

C. Release by Class Members

Plaintiffs and Class members who do not submit a valid and timely Request for Exclusion, will release all claims, rights, demands, liabilities, statutory causes of action, and theories of liability of every nature and description, whether known or unknown, that were alleged in the Action, or could have been alleged based on any facts, transactions, events, policies, occurrences, acts, disclosures, statements, omissions or failure to act pled in the Action against any of the Released Parties. This waiver and release will be final and binding on the Effective Date, and will

1 have every preclusive effect permitted by law.

2 **D. Notice Procedure**

3 The Parties have selected CPT Group, Inc. (“CPT”) to serve as the Administrator. The
4 Parties have agreed on the form of notice to be mailed to the Class and the method of notice to the
5 class (a) the Notice of Class Action Settlement and Estimated Individual Settlement Payment
6 [Exhibit A to the Settlement Agreement] and (b) the Request for Exclusion Form [Exhibit B to the
7 Settlement Agreement] (collectively "Class Notice Packet"). This Notice Packet, if approved by the
8 Court, shall be sent by the Administrator to the Settlement Class Members, by first class mail to
9 those addresses provided by Defendants. Each Settlement Class Member will have sixty (60) days
10 from the date the Notice Packet is initially mailed to postmark, fax or email any Requests for
11 Exclusion or Objections to the Settlement.

12 To participate in the settlement, a Class Member need not take any action. All members of
13 the settlement class shall receive a settlement check unless he or she opts-out of the settlement.
14 Any Class Member wishing to opt-out from the Settlement Agreement must sign and postmark a
15 written “Request for Exclusion” to the Settlement Administrator within the Response Deadline. The
16 postmark, fax, or email date will be the exclusive means to determine whether a Request for
17 Exclusion has been timely submitted.

18 The Class Members will have an opportunity to dispute their number of “shifts” and/or
19 “hours” credited to them in their Notice, provided they file a dispute with the Settlement
20 Administrator in writing postmarked, faxed, or emailed no later than 30 days after the mailing of
21 the Notices of Class Action Settlement. To the extent that Class Members dispute the number of
22 “shifts” and/or “hours”, Class Members may produce evidence to the Settlement Administrator
23 showing that such information is inaccurate. The Settlement Administrator will advise the Parties of
24 such dispute. Defendant’s records will be presumed correct, but the Settlement Administrator will
25 evaluate the evidence submitted by the Class Member and will make the final decision as to the
26 merits of the dispute within seven (7) days of receipt of the dispute.

27 To object to the Settlement Agreement (“Objection”), a Class Member can either submit a
28

1 written Objection to the Settlement Agreement or appear at the Final Approval hearing in person or
2 by and through counsel, to state and argue his/her objection to the Settlement. If a written Objection
3 is submitted, the Objection must be mailed, faxed, or emailed to the Settlement Administrator on or
4 before the Response Deadline. invalid. Alternatively, Class Members may appear at the Final
5 Approval Hearing to argue and present their Objections to the Court.

6 III.LEGAL ARGUMENT

7 A. The Settlement Agreement Resulted from Arm's-Length Negotiations

8 The presumption is that a proposed settlement is fair and reasonable when it is the result of
9 arm's-length negotiations. (*See Williams v. Vukovich* (6th Cir.1983) 720 F.2d 909, 922-923 ("The
10 court should defer to the judgment of experienced counsel who has competently evaluated the
11 strength of his proofs"); *In re Excess Value Ins. Coverage Litig.* (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2004) 2004 U.S.
12 Dist. LEXIS 14822, at *34 ("Where 'the Court finds that the settlement is the product of arm's length
13 negotiations conducted by experienced counsel knowledgeable in complex class litigation, the
14 Settlement will enjoy a presumption of fairness"); 4 Alba Conte & Herbert B. Newberg, *Newberg*
15 *on Class Actions* § 11.25 (4th ed. 2002); *Manual For Complex Litig.* (4th Ed. 2004), §21.612.)

16 The proposed settlement here is the product of arm's-length negotiations between the Parties
17 after extensive discovery and analysis. The Parties have investigated the applicable laws, as applied
18 to the facts discovered, regarding the alleged claims of the Class and potential defenses thereto, as
19 well as the damages claimed by thereon. Armed with this extensive body of information and analysis,
20 the Parties engaged in full, complete, and ultimately successful settlement discussions. At all times,
21 the negotiations leading to the Settlement have been adversarial, non-collusive and at arm's length,
22 which were mediated through a settlement judge at multiple mandatory settlement conferences.

23 B. Preliminary Approval of the Settlement is Warranted.

24 California Rules of Court 3.769 requires the court's approval of any class action settlement,
25 and an inquiry into the fairness of the proposed settlement prior to final approval. Cal. R. Ct.
26 3.769(a), (g). California's "[p]ublic policy generally favors the compromise of complex class action
27
28

1 litigation.” (*Nordstrom Comm’n Cases* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 576, 581 (quoting *Cellphone*
2 *Termination Fee Cases* (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1117-1118).)

3 Class actions settlements are approved where the proposed settlement is “fair, adequate and
4 reasonable.” *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801 (citing *Officers for Justice*
5 *v. Civil Serv. Comm’n* (9th Cir. 1982) 688 F.2d 615, 625, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1217 (1983)). A
6 presumption of fairness exists when: (1) the parties reached a settlement through arm’s-length
7 bargaining; (2) the parties conducted sufficient investigation and discovery to allow counsel and the
8 Court to act intelligently; (3) counsel are experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of
9 objector is small. *Dunk, supra*, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1802.

10 To determine whether the settlement is fair, the trial court considers all relevant factors,
11 including, but not limited to, “the strength of plaintiffs’ case, the risk, expense, complexity and
12 likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the
13 amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings,
14 the experience and views of counsel . . . and the reaction of the class members to the proposed
15 settlement.” *Dunk, supra*, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1801. The Court’s primary function is to ensure that
16 the settlement is not the product of fraud, overreaching, or collusion, and that the settlement, taken
17 as a whole, is fair, reasonable, and adequate to all concerned. *Id*

18 **1. The Strength of Plaintiffs’ Case**

19 Plaintiffs maintain that their claims are meritorious, and Plaintiffs are prepared to litigate
20 their claims through class certification and ultimately through trial. However, Plaintiffs are
21 cognizant of substantial risks and uncertainty in successfully proceeding with the litigation given
22 the multiple defenses to Plaintiffs’ claims that Defendant has presented, both on the merits and to
23 class certification.

24 **2. The Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Duration of Further Litigation**

25 The Parties have been litigating this matter for over 4 years and engaged in significant
26 formal discovery, document production, legal and data analysis. If the litigation is to continue, more
27 discovery will need to be conducted, including taking multiple depositions and continuing with
28

1 written and document discovery, in addition to preparing to file for class certification. Even if
2 Plaintiffs' class certification motion were granted, the Parties would incur significantly more
3 attorneys' fees and costs through possible decertification motion, trial, and possible appeal. This
4 settlement avoids those risks and avoids incurring further expense.

5 **3. The Risk of Maintaining Class Action Status**

6 As Plaintiffs have not yet filed for class certification, there is certainly a risk of not having a
7 certified class at the time of trial. This settlement avoids this risk. Plaintiffs recognize the
8 challenges they face in certifying a class and establishing liability on the underlying wage and hour
9 claims.

10 **4. The Amount Offered in Settlement**

11 The proposed class settlement provides fair and reasonable monetary recovery for the
12 proposed Class considering Defendant's defenses to Plaintiffs' claims. It is well settled that
13 California courts recognize that "the merits of the underlying class claims are not a basis for
14 upsetting the settlement of a class action" and the settlement need not provide one-hundred percent
15 of the damages sought in order to be judged reasonable. *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.* (2001) 91
16 Cal.App.4th 224, 246 and 250. "Thus, even if 'the relief afforded by the proposed settlement is
17 substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated,' this is not a bar
18 to class settlement because 'the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement in
19 which each side around in the interest of avoiding litigation.'" *Id.* (quoting *Air Lines Stewards v.*
20 *American Airlines, Inc.* (7th Cir. 1972) 455 F.2d 101, 109).

21 To allow this Court to make an informed assessment of the proposed Settlement pursuant to
22 *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 18 Cal.App.4th 116, Plaintiffs' Counsel provides the
23 following assessment of the claims and settlement. Courts have determined that settlements are, of
24 course, reasonable even where Plaintiff recovers only a portion of their actual losses. *See Behrens*
25 *v. Wometco Enters., Inc.* (S.D. Fla. 1988) 118 F.R.D. 534, 542 ("[T]he fact that a proposed
26 settlement amounts to only a fraction of the potential recovery does not mean the settlement is
27 unfair or inadequate."). Indeed, "[a] settlement can be satisfying even if it amounts to a hundredth
28

or even - a thousandth of a single percent of the potential recovery.” *Id*; see also *Glass v. UBS Financial Servs.* (C.D.Cal. 2007) 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8476, *28-29 (approving settlement of an action claiming unpaid wages where the settlement amount constituted approximately 25% to 35% of the estimated actual loss to the class).

a. Failure to Pay Prevailing Wages

Plaintiffs contend that Defendant failed to pay prevailing wages at the Mercy Housing Project when their hours were classified as “Laborer Group 3” and were paid at the lower Laborer’s Prevailing Wage Rate. To calculate Defendants’ liability exposure for this claim, Plaintiffs obtained the following data: there are 18 members in the Mercy Housing Project Subclass, and the total number of hours that were paid as “Laborer Group 3” was 8007 hours. Assuming that these hours should have been paid at the higher Carpenter’s Prevailing Wage Rate, Plaintiff calculate that the total exposure is approximately \$176,989.83.

	Total Hours Classified as "Laborer Group 3"	Carpenter's Prevailing Wage Rate (Total Hourly Rate)	Laborer Group 3's Prevailing Wage Rate (Total Hourly Rate)	What Should Have Been Paid at the Carpenter's Prevailing Wage Rate	What Was Actually Paid at the Laborer Group 3's Prevailing Wage Rate	Unpaid Prevailing Wages
07/01/2016 - 06/30/2017	3129	\$ 72.79	\$ 51.24	\$ 227,759.91	\$ 160,329.96	\$ 67,429.95
07/01/2017 - 06/30/2018	4878	\$ 75.30	\$ 52.84	\$ 367,313.40	\$ 257,753.52	\$ 109,559.88
07/01/2018 - 06/30/2019	0	\$ 77.97	\$ 54.49	-	-	-
						\$ 176,989.83

However, there is a significant risk that this claim may not be susceptible to class certification and may ultimately fail on its merits in light of Defendant’s contention that California law expressly permits payment of different wage rates to the same worker on any prevailing wage project, according to the character of the work actually performed. Defendant contends that accurate time records were maintained to track the different characters of the work performed by its

1 employees at the Mercy Housing Project. Defendant cited to the Department of Industrial Relations
2 Publics Works Manual, which contain a section titled “Different Classifications for the Same
3 Worker,” wherein it is stated that:

4 The minimum prevailing wage for hours worked in the execution of a
5 contract for pubic [sic] works is based upon the specified prevailing
6 rates “for work of a similar character” (LC §§ 1771 and 1774.)
7 Therefore, it is possible that one worker may perform more than one
8 type of work during the course of a project.

9 ...

10 Consistent with the language of Labor Code 1771, a contractor is
11 generally not required to pay its workers at a rate higher than that
12 specified in a particular wage determination for the type of work
13 performed.

14 This conclusion would require individualized inquiries into how each worker at the Mercy
15 Housing Project spent time in terms of their actual duties and may further support Defendant’s
16 merit-based defense.

17 Accordingly, based on the significant risk that Plaintiffs would be unable to establish
18 liability for allegedly unpaid prevailing wages, Plaintiffs discounted the maximum potential
19 exposure by 50% for risk of non-certification, and by an additional 50% to account for a risk of
20 being unsuccessful on the merits and/or a substantial reduction in damages, to arrive at an estimated
21 exposure of approximately **\$44,247**.

22 **b. Failure to Pay Overtime Wages**

23 Plaintiffs’ claim for unpaid overtime wages is based on Defendant’s alternative workweek
24 schedule. Plaintiffs contend that notwithstanding the 12/18/2012 AWS election, Defendant was
25 required to hold a separate AWS election at every other job site subsequent to the 12/18/2012
26 election. Defendant did not have a separate AWS election at work sites other than the one held on
27 12/18/2012, and hence Defendant was required to pay overtime wages when its employees worked
28 more than 8 hours per day.

 To calculate Defendants’ liability exposure for this claim, Plaintiffs obtained the following
data: there are 484 members in the Class, the total number of shifts worked by all class members in
excess of 8.0 hours under the AWS was 99,239 shifts, and the estimated average hourly rate for

1 workers on AWS projects was \$28.01. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs estimated Defendant's
2 maximum potential exposure as \$694,921.

3 On the other hand, Defendant has presented a strong argument that (1) scores of employers
4 in the construction industry have (like Saarman) conducted workforce-wide AWS elections and
5 applied them to future projects; and (2) the DLSE has never taken any action to prevent it.
6 Furthermore, Defendant argues that Wage Order 16 on AWS election procedures does not clearly
7 support Plaintiffs' position that the term "work unit" must be interpreted to mean "work site" and
8 that no court or legal authority has interpreted Wage Order 16 in the manner Plaintiffs have argued.
9 This argument would defeat Plaintiffs' claim for unpaid overtime wages entirely.

10 Accordingly, Plaintiffs discounted the maximum potential exposure by 50% for risk of non-
11 certification, and by an additional 80% to account for a risk of being unsuccessful on the merits
12 and/or a substantial reduction in damages, to arrive at an estimated exposure of approximately
13 **\$69,492.**

14 **c. Failure to Reimburse for Commute Mileage/ Travel**

15 Plaintiffs' claim for failure to indemnify work expenditures is based on Defendant's failure
16 to reimburse Plaintiffs and Class Members for commute mileage under Labor Code § 2802, which
17 requires an employer to indemnify an employee "for all necessary expenditures or losses incurred
18 by the employee in direct consequence of the discharge of his or her duties." To calculate
19 Defendant's liability exposure for this claim, Plaintiffs relied on the following data provided by
20 Defendant: there is a total of 804 project sites during the Class Period and 232,357 work shifts at
21 those sites. Taking Defendant's main office in San Francisco as the starting point of their morning
22 commute to the job site, and relying on the standard mileage rates from the Internal Revenue
23 Service, Plaintiffs estimated the total unreimbursed commute mileage to be \$3,590,466.

24 However, Defendant has argued that California law allows an employer to require workers
25 to furnish "hand tools and equipment" if such tools and equipment are "customarily required by the
26 trade or craft." IWC Wage Order 16, section 8(B). Wage Order 16, section 8(B) states: "[w]hen
27 the employer requires the use of tools or equipment or they are necessary for the performance of a
28

1 job, such tools and equipment shall be provided and maintained by the employer, except that an
2 employee whose wages are at least two (2) times the minimum wage may provide and maintain
3 hand tools and equipment customarily required by the particular trade or craft in conformity with
4 Labor Code Section 2802.” Defendant argued that because Class Members and Plaintiffs were
5 paid at a rate not less than two times the minimum wage, they could provide and maintain their own
6 hand tools and equipment customarily required by their trade, and that they were not being
7 “required” to bring their own tools and are not entitled to any separate commute mileage
8 reimbursement or commute time payment. Additionally, any inquiry into Class Members’
9 entitlement to commute mileage reimbursement would require individualized questions into what
10 trade they were in, what duties they performed, what tools they carried, whether they were free
11 from control of the employer during their commute time, and whether they drove their own vehicles
12 or were given a ride.

13 Accordingly, Plaintiffs discounted the maximum potential exposure by 80% for risk of non-
14 certification, and by an additional 80% to account for a risk of being unsuccessful on the merits
15 and/or a substantial reduction in damages, to arrive at an estimated exposure of approximately
16 **\$143,618.**

17 **d. Failure to Furnish Accurate Wage Statements**

18 Plaintiffs contend that Defendant issued defective wage statements because (1) Defendant
19 did not pay all prevailing wages at the Carpenter’s Prevailing Wage Rate at the Mercy Housing
20 Project; and (2) Defendant did not account for and pay overtime wages to those employees who
21 worked more than 8 hours under the AWS. As a result, Plaintiffs contend that they are entitled to
22 penalties under Labor Code section 226(e) as follows:

23 An employee suffering injury as a result of a knowing and intentional
24 failure by an employer to comply with subdivision (a) is entitled to
25 recover the greater of all actual damages or fifty dollars (\$50) for the
26 initial pay period in which a violation occurs and one hundred dollars
(\$100) per employee for each violation in a subsequent pay period,
not exceeding an aggregate penalty of four thousand dollars (\$4,000),
and is entitled to an award of costs and reasonable attorney s fees.

27 As a penalty, this waiting time penalty claim under Labor Code § 226 is governed by the
28

1 one-year statute of limitations of Code of Civil Procedure § 340, which means that the relevant
2 recovery period is July 20, 2017 through the present. The maximum waiting penalty recoverable
3 per employee is \$4000, assuming the employee has worked more than 40 pay periods in which
4 there was at least one wage and hour violation. Plaintiffs and Class Members were paid biweekly
5 or every 2 weeks. According to Defendant's data, Defendant's workforce working on its AWS
6 projects decreased to 130-142 employees by 2017 and remained at this level through 2022.
7 Assuming the maximum recovery of \$4000 per employee, an estimated liability exposure is
8 \$568,000 (\$4000 x 142 employees).

9 However, in order to obtain penalties under Labor Code section 226, Plaintiffs must prove
10 that Defendant's failure to furnish accurate wage statements was "knowing and intentional."
11 However, Defendant has presented a "good faith dispute" defense that would preclude the finding
12 of "knowing and intentional" failure. In particular, Defendant argues that it relied on its reasonable
13 interpretation of Wage Order 16 to apply the 12/18/2012 AWS to other projects, and relied on the
14 Department of Industrial Relations Publics Works Manual to pay different wage rates to the same
15 worker on any prevailing wage project, according to the character of the work actually performed.

16 Given Defendants' good faith defense to Plaintiffs' underlying claims, and individual
17 inquiries that may be required to determine liability as discussed above, Plaintiffs discounted this
18 amount by 80% for risk of non-certification and by an additional 80% for risk of being unsuccessful
19 on the merits or not recovering the full amount sought, to arrive at an estimated exposure of
20 **\$22,720** on this claim.

21 **e. Waiting Time Penalties**

22 Plaintiffs contend that Defendants failed to compensate Class Members all wages due and
23 owing at the end of each Class Member's employment if his/her employment ended during the
24 Class Period. These earned and unpaid wages include Class Members' prevailing wages at the
25 Mercy Housing Project and their overtime wages who worked more than 8 hours under the AWS.
26 To calculate Defendant's liability exposure for this claim, Plaintiffs utilized the following data from
27 Defendant: there are 484 members in the Class, and the estimated average hourly rate was \$28.01.
28

1 As of the date of this Motion, there are 84 current employees and 400 former employees. Applying
2 this figure to generate waiting time penalties for the maximum period of 30 days, Defendant's
3 liability exposure is \$2,688,960.

4 On the other hand, Defendants assert that they have several good faith defenses to waiting
5 time penalties that would preclude a finding of willfulness under Section 203, which is sufficient to
6 defeat a claim for and preclude waiting time penalties. *See* 8 Cal. Reg. Code § 13520 (A "good faith
7 dispute" that any wages are due occurs when an employer presents a defense, based in law or fact
8 which, if successful, would preclude any recover on the part of the employee. The fact that a
9 defense is ultimately unsuccessful will not preclude a finding that a good faith dispute did exist.
10 Defenses presented which, under all the circumstances, are unsupported by any evidence, are
11 unreasonable, or are presented in bad faith, will preclude a finding of a "good faith dispute."); *In re*
12 *Trombley* (1948) 31 Cal.2d 801, 808.

13 Defendant has presented a strong "good faith dispute" defense to both the unpaid prevailing
14 wages and the unpaid overtime wages. Additionally, determining liability may require highly
15 individualized inquiries. Accordingly, Plaintiffs discounted this amount by 80% for risk of non-
16 certification and by an additional 80% for risk of being unsuccessful on the merits or not recovering
17 the full amount sought, to arrive at an estimate exposure of **\$107,558** on this claim.

18 **5. Summary of Kullar Analysis**

19 Using these estimated recovery figures for each of the claims described above, Plaintiffs
20 estimate that the optimal recovery for the Class would be approximately **\$387,635**, so that the Gross
21 Settlement Amount of \$150,000 would represent approximately **39%** of the recovery if Plaintiffs
22 successfully certify the claims and win all of them on their merits. This is well within the realm of
23 being fair, reasonable, and adequate. (*See, e.g. Glass v. UBS Financial Servs.* (C.D.Cal. 2007) 2007
24 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8476, *28-29 (approving settlement which represented 25 to 35% of potential
25 damages); *Dunleavy v. Nadler* (9th Cir. 2000) 213 F.3d 454, 459 (approving settlement which
26 represented "roughly one-sixth of the potential recovery"); *Linney v. Cellular Alaska Partnership*
27 (9th Cir. 1998) 151 F.3d 1234, 1242 ("The fact that a proposed settlement may only amount to a
28

1 fraction of the potential recovery does not, in and of itself, mean the proposed settlement is grossly
2 inadequate or should be disapproved).)

3 **6. The Extent of Discovery Completed and the Stage of the Proceedings**

4 As described in detail above, the Parties have engaged in a thorough investigation before the
5 proposed settlement was reached to allow the Parties to fully evaluate the claims and defenses.
6 Based on the investigation and analysis conducted, Plaintiffs submit that the proposed settlement is
7 reasonable. Absent settlement, Plaintiffs are at the stage of proceedings where they would be
8 preparing to file a motion for class certification.

9 **7. The Experience and Views of Counsel**

10 The view of qualified and well-informed counsel of a class action that the settlement is fair,
11 adequate, and reasonable is entitled to significant weight. *See Kullar, supra*, 168 Cal.App.4th 116,
12 133 (the trial court “may and undoubtedly should continue to place reliance on the competence and
13 integrity of counsel, the involvement of a qualified mediator, and the paucity of objectors to the
14 settlement”); *see also Ellis v. Naval Air Rework Facility* (N.D. Cal. 1980) 87 F.R.D. 15, 18 (“the
15 fact that experienced counsel involved in the case approved the settlement after hard-fought
16 negotiations is entitled to considerable weight.”)

17 Plaintiffs’ Counsel are experienced in employment law and wage and hour class actions,
18 including cases involving similar claims at issue in this case. Counsel is thus qualified to evaluate
19 the claims and defenses and to evaluate settlement versus continued litigation on a fully informed
20 basis. Plaintiffs’ Counsel thoroughly reviewed all information gathered through discovery and drew
21 on their experience in similar cases to evaluate Plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs’ counsel believe that
22 this is a fair and reasonable settlement in light of the complexities of the case and uncertainties of
23 class certification and further litigation.

24 Moreover, the settlement was reached with the assistance of Judge Massullo. The settlement
25 was only reached after Judge Massullo engaged in extensive discussions with the Parties regarding
26 the merits of their claims and defenses, their legal analyses, a fair settlement value for the case
27 given the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiffs’ claims. This factor strongly supports preliminary
28

1 approval of the class settlement. *Kullar, supra*, 168 Cal.App.4th at 130.

2 **8. The Settlement Has No “Obvious Deficiencies” and Falls Well Within the**
3 **Range for Approval**

4 The proposed Settlement Agreement has no “obvious deficiencies” and is well within the
5 range of possible approval. The settlement provides significant monetary relief to Class Members,
6 reflecting 39% of the estimated recovery that the Class could reasonably expect in light of the
7 significant litigation risks and disputed wage claims. *See Dunleavy, supra*, 213 F.3d at 459
8 (approving settlement which represented “roughly one-sixth of the potential recovery”); *National*
9 *Rural Telecomm. Coop. v. DirectTV, Inc.* (C.D. Cal. 2004) 221 F.R.D. 523, 527 (“it is well-settled
10 law that a proposed settlement may be acceptable even though it amounts to only a fraction of the
11 potential recovery that might be available to the class members at trial”).

12 **C. The Court Should Approve the Proposed Notice of Class Action.**

13 The threshold requirement regarding the sufficiency of class notice is whether the means
14 proposed for distributing the notice are reasonably calculated to apprise the class of the pendency of
15 the action, the proposed settlement, and the right to object to the settlement. Cal. R. Ct. 3.769(f).
16 The standard for adequacy of notice to class members is “whether the notice has ‘a reasonable
17 chance of reaching a substantial percentage of the class members.’” *Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th
18 at 251 (citing *Cartt v. Superior Court* (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960, 974).


19 The content of the class notice is also subject to court approval and the notice must fairly
20 apprise the class members of the terms of the proposed compromise and of the options open to
21 opposing the settlement. Cal. R. Ct. 3.766(d); *Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 251. If class
22 members are given the option to opt-out, the notice must include: (1) brief explanation of the case,
23 including the basic contentions or denials of the parties; (2) statement that the court will exclude the
24 member from the class if the member so requests by a specified date; (3) procedure for the member
25 to follow in requesting exclusion from the class; (4) statement that the judgment, whether favorable
26 or not, will bind all members who do not request exclusion; and (5) statement that any member who
27 does not request exclusion may, if the member so desires, enter an appearance through counsel. *Id.*;
28 *Cellphone Term. Fee Cases* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1390; Cal. R. Ct. 3.766(d), 3.769(f).

1 Here, the proposed Notice of Class Action conforms to the Rules of Court and this Court's
2 guidelines. The proposed plan to distribute the notice to Class Members by U.S. Mail is reasonable
3 as it provides individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.
4 *Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline* (1974) 417 U.S. 156, 173 (deeming individual notice mailed to the
5 class members to be one of the "best notice practicable."). The Parties have agreed to use CPT
6 Group, an experienced settlement administrator, who will perform a National Change of Address
7 search and in-depth skip tracing search in order to obtain the best possible addresses for Class
8 Members.

9 The Notice is to be mailed in two versions, in English and Spanish. The Notice contains
10 comprehensive information regarding the case, the terms of settlement, estimated payment for each
11 Class Member and the method of calculation, the final approval hearing, and instructions as to how
12 to opt-out or object to the settlement. Class Members will have 60 days to opt-out or object and 30
13 days to dispute their shifts and/or hours. Class Members who do not opt out will be bound to the
14 terms of the settlement and will release all claims against Defendants that were pled or could have
15 been pled based on the facts alleged in the Action. Further, each Plaintiff has agreed to a general
16 release of all claims against Defendants, including a waiver of *Civil Code* section 1542. Plaintiffs
17 submit that the content of the Notice is sufficient to fairly apprise Class Members regarding the
18 terms of the settlement and option and instruction as to how to opt-out, object, or dispute shifts or
19 hours, and satisfies the requirement under Rule 3.766 of California Rules of Court.

20 Dated: February 24, 2023

MICHAEL H. KIM, P.C.

21
22 By: 
23 Michael H. Kim, Esq.
24 Attorneys for Plaintiffs
25 FERNANDO GUTIERREZ; DAVID
26 CASTILLO; MARCO GONZALEZ,
27 individually and on behalf of others similarly
28 situated